Prehistory and background:
The exact experimental sciences
applying furthermore mathematical models, and first of all: physics, require
for the suggested hypothesis to forecast experimentally testable effects.
On the contrary, almost all
other sciences, and first of all: humanities, do not require forecast, but only
some kind explanation of the most of the known relevant facts admitting even
various exceptions.
Accordingly, one can distinguish
“forecasting understanding” among the former kind from the “explaining
understanding” of the latter kind.
Then, one can grant
understanding as the unification of explanation and forecast and thus found a
set-theory approach to model explanation and forecast as two modifications of
understanding.
Thesis:
1 The explanation and forecast
as two ways of understanding can be modeled in terms of set theory
disjunctively if and only if the concept of infinity is involved at least
implicitly.
2 Then, both explanation and
forecast correspond to the property definitive for the set of all relevant
facts meant by the hypothesis.
2.1 The former suggests that
property not to be finite, which means practically unlimited links between the
text of the hypothesis and its context.
2.2 The latter suggests that
property is finite and its text should be disjunctively distinguishable from
its context.
3 Understanding in both cases
means referring to the relevant context, however in the latter case it is negligible
for the context can be recreated thoroughly by uniform continuation of the
text.
3.1 That uniform continuation of
the text is the essence of forecast once mathematical model is utilizable as in
the latter case.
3.2 Any uniform continuation is
impossible in principle and thus any forecast in the former case. It needs some
choices and therefore interpretation and interpreter.
A series
of arguments for the thesis based on:
-
The
relation between Peano arithmetic and set theory
-
The axiom
of choice and well-ordering principle
-
The Gödel
completeness (1930) and incompleteness (1931) theorems
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