Action as the common measure of randomness and free will

One needs a common measure of randomness and free well. Both cause results, which are comparable. Given any fact without being known its origin, the question whether its origin is natural (i.e. random, occasional) or freewill action (intentional, constructive) arises. The result in both cases is one and the same as well as action and even the physical quantity of action. However the natural process being just random would require much more time in comparison with any intentional action.

Further, one can determine the quantity of “effective energy” as efficiency necessary for a given
result to be obtained for some certain period of time. All natural processes will have much, much less

“effective energy” than any intentional one. That approach allows of a quantity, the effective energy in question, to be associated with any causal process just as a measure of its capability to cause (e.g. a

certain effect established as a standard for causality to be measurable).

In particular, the so-called deterministic and indeterministic processes will be comparable in effective energy or efficiency. Thus a continuum according to efficiency as the degree of causality will extend between the two poles only qualitative until now, those of determinism and indeterminism. The traditional opposition of human free will and the alleged determinism of nature will turn out to be irrelevant.

In fact at least one exact and experimental science such as quantum mechanics doubts hat  opposition. It deduces “free will theorems” (Conway, Kochen 2005; 2008) from its mathematical and experimental ground: “if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity” (Conway, Kochen 2006:

1441).
Many other scientific areas such as neuroscience, computer science, theory of artificial intellect,

theory of information, etc. see a series of benefits to follow the way of quantum mechanics: The single binary opposition of free will and determinism seems to be rather outdated and should be at least complemented by a smooth transition between them needing a common measure such as action. Even more, the quantities of physical action and information (or entropy) turn out to be equitable.

References:
Conway, J., Kochen, S. (2006) "The Free Will Theorem," Foundations of Physics 36 (10): 1441–1473.
Conway, J., Kochen, S. (2009) “The Strong Free Will Theorem,” Notices of the AMS 56 (2): 226-232.

#
#

The presentation as a PDF or a video; furthermore as slides @ EasyChair