The naive attitude to the world, after which the words and the things are not distinguished from each other, was restored by Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. The “phenomenon” can be naturally interpreted linguistically, semiotically, and logically as those words, which are the "things themselves", or as the true signs, after which the signifier and the signified are not connected quite loosely and conventionally, but are linked to each other necessarily and thus all the three, sign, signifier, and signified coincide with each other, therefore meaning the same from three different viewpoints. Furthermore, 'phenomenon' can be also understood as the unit of the language of "zero-level" and its corresponding logic.
Logic involves the concept of the "order" of a certain given logic according to whether its symbols may refer only to external things ("first-order logic"), to symbols of external things ("second-order logic") as well, to the symbols of symbols of external things ("third-order logic"), etc.
One natural generalization of that logical conception is the introduction of "zero-order logic" as well as the corresponding "zero-level language". The symbols do not refer to external things, but they coincide by themselves with those external things. Thus the naive attitude to the world, after which the things and the words coincide by themselves, is transformed in a rigorous and logical notion, that of "zero-level language".
Then, the concept of ontology admits one exact logical definition as any zero-level language or as all zero-level languages. The properties of the zero-order logic and zero-level language can be naturally transferred and thus interpreted as formal and logical properties of ontology allowing of the axiomatic definition of "formal ontology" as a certain mathematical category.
That fundamental approach is widely applied in the research of software formal and artificial languages created by humans for computers for all of them are logically rigorous and grounded on logic. After that conception of formal ontology, the consideration of any programing language to itself rather than to an external supposed "hardware" or to an external reality supposedly modelled generates a formal ontology. On the other hand, meaning a certain hardware or reality for being modelled as granted, a formal software language only repeating them would be their corresponding formal ontology.
The problem: May ontology be defined exhaustedly and unambiguously by its language?
The thesis:
(1) Yes, it may if its language is defined in turn as the zero-level language.
(2) The fundamental features of ontology according to the philosophical meaning of ‘ontology’ can be deduced from the formal properties of ‘zero-level language’.
(3) A few interesting new corollaries are implied by the formal and axiomatic postulating ontology as the zero-level language.
A few arguments in favour of the thesis:
About (1):
The etymology of “ontology” in ancient Greek addresses the Word which exists, therefore postulating the identity of ‘word’ and ‘thing’. The same idea penetrates Christianity and its theology: what exists is God’s Word. Thus the zero-level language is right God’s language. God’s language was secularized into the “language of nature”, and mathematics was alleged as it in the modern age. However, mathematics unlike God’s language was understood as a “human language”, i.e. not as a zero-level language. The distinction between mathematical model and reality is a fundamental postulate of philosophy of science.
Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s fundamental ontology resurrected the concept of the zero-level language in philosophical terms and as a properly philosophical project versus that of philosophy of science or analytic philosophy.
Consequently, the idea of ontology as the zero-level language is an ancient conception in history of philosophy and theology with many arguments in its favor and discussed during centuries. That understanding of ontology implies its coincidence with its language. If meta-level is postulated as different from the level itself for any language created by humans and thus conventional, this in turn implies the hypothesis of the zero-level language, which is single unlike the plurality of human languages and in which the meta-level of the words coincides with the level the things. In particular, the mathematical models of reality should coincide with reality if mathematics as the “language of nature” would be interpreted as that zero-level language. This is an idea, the origin of which can be traced to Pythagoras and his successors even before or simultaneously with the beginning of philosophy in ancient Greece.
About (2):
Ontology is both language and being as the etymology of the word demonstrates. It consists of those words, which are not conventional, but linked to the existing entities necessarily. It is a single one in philosophical definition unlike the definition of formal ontology, after which a given, even usually artificial language and thus conventional is only postulated as an ontology among many others available or possible. All these fundamental features of ontology are implied immediately by its understanding as the zero-level language.
Furthermore, ontology implies a special conception of truth, which is not that of correspondence: the correspondence of words and things, for the words coincide with the things by themselves. Ontology is necessarily true in the sense of correspondence in definition and thus that conception of truth as adequacy is useless and meaningless being always valid. Heidegger tried to replace “adæquatio” by ἀλήθεια (unhiddenness) as that kind of truth relevant to ontology. Its sense is the ontology itself as truth or as the special kind of philosophical truth. It means one to move to ontology from any kind of non-ontology. Any non-ontology is mediated by some language conventional to the signified and therefore the former “hides” the latter. If however one manages to see ontology, Hussrel’s “things themselves”, or “phenomena”, which “show themselves in themselves by themselves” in Heidegger, the “veil vanishes” and truth appears by itself right as “unhiddennes”, ἀλήθεια. Thus, ontology is the state of being in truth as well as what is seen in that seen for the state and the seen coincide in definition of ontology.
The zero-level language implies an analogical concept of truth: if many realities have been involved, only a single one is privileged as true, right ontology. Accordingly: if many language have been involved, only a single one is privileged as true, right the zero-level language therefore necessarily coinciding with ontology.
Ontology is totality. In particular, it contains its externality within itself, and any meta-position to it should be internal within itself. For example, the universe can be postulated so in a physical sense of totality and therefore any other universe should contains within it. All those conditions are only extraordinary and seemingly paradoxical, but not contradictory.
The zero-level language implies a similar, mirror kind of totality. Indeed any language as a special kind of ‘thing’ will be an element within the zero-level language.
About (3):
The interpretation of ontology as the zero-level language implies it to be interpreted formally, logically, and mathematically, e.g. as the maximal formal ontology. This involves in turn a kind of neo-Pythagoreanism for ontology in the most fundamental sense turns out to be mathematical, and the Number underlies that Word coinciding with the Thing.
For example, one can introduce the mathematical notion of group for the hierarchy of both languages and realities generalizing the intention of Russell’s theory of types. Then, ontology coinciding with the zero-level language would be the zero (or “unit”) element of that group and thus privileged.
The discussed above totality of the zero-level language needing the entire group to be represented into its zero element implies both complementarity (e.g. in the sense of Niels Bohr) and mathematical axiom of choice equivalent to the principle of well-ordering. That complementarity of language and reality implies for the linguistic units such as words to be interpreted as ontological “quanta”, in which the counterpart of word is fundamentally inseparable from the counterpart of thing. The language of ontology as the zero-level language consists right of those ontological quanta.
That zero-level language of ontological quanta being identical to ontology is the fundamental reality as well. Consequently, one can interpret the physical quanta of action determined by the fundamental Planck constant just as the ontological quanta at issue according to the contemporary level of knowledge. Then, quantum mechanics would supply by the necessary zero-level language of ontology, which is furthermore properly mathematical: the formalism of the separable complex Hilbert space.
That formalism of quantum mechanics implies an internal proof of completeness as what the theorems about the absence of hidden variables in quantum mechanics (Neumann 1932; Kochen, Specker 1968) can be interpreted. That proof confirms indirectly the formalism of quantum mechanics as the zero-level language of ontology as it is supposed to be complete correspondingly to the totality of ontology. This implies furthermore a few corollaries about the consistency and completeness proof of mathematics for it should underlie ontology according any form of neo-Pythagoreanism. The separable complex Hilbert space as a generalization of Peano arithmetic is what is able to ground mathematics.
Conclusion: the interpretation of ontology as the zero-level language is useful and fruitful.
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